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Note: The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate
the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation
In recent years the legal profession has received criticism
with increasing frequency. Demands for change in the pro-
fession's ethical code1 and economic structure 2 and for improve-
ment in the quality and availability of legal services3 have
proliferated. Response to these demands may come from sever-
al different sources. The organized bar itself has reacted to
public pressure and moved to "internally" correct its problems.4
The federal government, although its involvement in this area is
of recent origin, may become a significant source of corrective
1. See, e.g., Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety
of the Canons as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968);
Comment, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 YALE L.J. 1179 (1970).
The rules forbidding attorney advertising have been under especially
heavy attack, on the ground that they impinge upon the public's first
amendment right to information concerning access to legal representa-
tion, see Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to
Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972), and on the
ground that they violate the antitrust laws, see note 2 infra. The re-
strictions may soon be eased. See note 4 infra.
2. See, e.g., 1 M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 534-40
(1971). Green suggests that the legal profession is noncompetitive be-
cause of such artificial barriers to competition as advertising restrictions,
see note 1 supra, and, until recently, minimum fee schedules. The latter
were recently struck down on antitrust grounds, Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), and the advertising canons have been
challenged on the same ground. Person v. Association of the Bar, Civil
No. 75C 987 (E.D.N.Y., filed June 23, 1975); Consumers' Union v. Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n, Civil No. 75-0105-R (E.D. Va., filed Feb. 27, 1975).
3. See generally B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERs FOR PEOPLE OF MODER-
ATE MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AvAIABiLITY OF LEGAL SERVICES (1970).
Christensen, along with many other commentators, argues that there is
a large need for legal services among people of moderate means. He
proposes various solutions for the problem, including more effective use
of nonprofessional personnel, specialization, larger law practices, finan-
cial subsidies, legal service financing plans, and group legal services.
4. The American Bar Association (ABA), for example, recently
voted to liberalize its ethical restrictions on advertising. See Code
Amendments Broaden Information Lawyers May Provide in Law Lists,
Directories, and Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A.J. 309 (1976). Although the
ABA's action does not bind state bars, they are likely to follow its
lead. Schroeder, ABA Takes Action on Advertising and Bankruptcy
Legislation, 44 HENNEPIN LAWYER 7 (March-April 1976). It has been
argued that responsible self-regulation by the organized bar is the best
approach to meeting major problems within the profession. Brink, Who
Will Regulate the Bar?, 61 A.B.A.J. 936 (1975).
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action. 5 Finally, the states may regulate attorneys within their
respective jurisdictions. State regulation involves a complicating
factor, however, for a fundamental constitutional question may
arise: what is the proper relationship between the legislative and
judicial branches of government in regulating the legal profes-
sion and the practice of law?0
The issue is not a novel one, but its appropriate resolution
is still far from clear. Judicial regulation of the legal profession
has predominated for many years. Yet legislative regulation of
the profession has existed concomitantly, and the boundary
between the two prerogatives has remained remarkably ill de-
fined.7
Courts have premised their power to regulate on the con-
cept of "inherent" judicial power. Inherent judicial powers
are those not expressly granted by constitution but said to arise
from the very existence of the judiciary as an independent
branch of government. The constitutional creation of a "court"
5. See Hearing on the Organized Bar: Self-Serving or Serving
the Public? Before the Subcomm. on the Representation of Citizen In-
terests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. REV.
333 (1975). Tunney and Frank suggest that the federal government
could change restrictive bar association rules, subsidize legal services
programs, reduce costs by restricting legal fees, and require pro bono
publico activities from attorneys as a condition to their admission to
federal practice. The Justice Department has already been effective in
bringing about changes in ABA rules on group legal services. Justice
Department Continues Its Contentions that the Houston Amendments
Raise Serious Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A.J. 1410 (1974); House of Del-
egates Has Midyear Meeting in Chicago, 61 A.B.A.J. 463 (1975).
6. In more than half the states, the legal profession is regulated
by integrated bar associations. Under these systems all attorneys are
required to be members of the state bar, which promulgates rules and
conducts disciplinary activities under the ultimate supervision of the
state supreme court. Some of these systems have been set up by statute
and some by court rule. See J. PAnNess, CITATIONS AND IBLIOGRAPHY
ON T=R UNITED BAR IN ME UNITED STATES (1973); Winters, The Inte-
grated Bar in the United States, 62 L. Soc'ys GZ=TTE 219 (1965). In-
tegrated bar associations may be viewed as arms of the judicial
branch, as creatures of the legislature, or as a mixture of both. Compare
In re Schatz, 80 Wash. 2d 604, 607, 497 P.2d 153, 155 (1972) (majority
opinion) with id. at 618-19, 497 P.2d at 161 (dissenting opinion).
7. See text accompanying notes 70-76 infra. See generally Green,
The Courts' Power Over Admission and Disbarment, 4 TExAs L. REV. 1
(1925); Shanfeld, The Scope of Judicial Independence of the Legislature
in Matters of Procedure and Control of the Bar, 19 ST. Louis L. REV.
163, 170 (1934); Note, Admission to the Bar and the Separation of Pow-
ers, 7 UTm L. REV. 82 (1960); Comment, Separation of Powers: Who
Should Control the Bar?, 47 J. URBAN L. 715 (1969).
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implies that it must have the incidental powers necessary to its
dignity, functioning, and survival.8 Under this theory the
courts have claimed the power to punish for contempt,9 to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure,10 to control certain
nonadjudicatory administrative matters," to admit, supervise,
and disbar attorneys12 and generally regulate the practice of
law.13 The theory with regard to regulation of attorneys is that,
because they are officers of the court whose activities are crucial
to the court's operation, their qualifications and conduct must be
subject to the control of the court.
The theory of inherent judicial powers is inextricably bound
up with that of separation of powers. The latter is a fundamen-
8. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635,
636 (1935). Inherent power has also been termed "implied," "inciden-
tal," or "necessary," and for the most part the terms are used inter-
changeably. Courts have, however, occasionally distinguished the terms
depending on the scope and source of the power being exercised. Com-
pare State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928) (majority opin-
ion) with id. at 536, 221 N.W. at 605 (dissenting opinion). But these
distinctions have been characterized as a matter of nomenclature and
not of substance. In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 393, 240 N.W. 441, 449
(1932).
9. Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199 (1896).
10. Control over practice and procedure has long been exercised
concurrently by the legislature and the judiciary, with ultimate authority
generally conceded to the legislature. Courts have, however, stated that
the power to prescribe such rules is an "inherent" power. Lancaster
v. Waukegan & Sw. Ry., 132 Ill. 492, 24 N.E. 629 (1890) (dictum). Con-
stitutional allocation of this power between court and legislature varies
a great deal among the states. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958).
11. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963) (salaries of
clerical help); Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172,
125 N.E.2d 709 (1955) (hiring and salary of probation officer); Stowell
v. Jackson County Supervisors, 57 Mich. 31, 23 N.W. 557 (1885) (board
and lodging for jurors); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa.
45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (compelling addition
of money to judicial budget); In re Court Room and Offices of Circuit
Court, 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912) (adequate quarters).
12. In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933). For a
discussion of Greathouse see text accompanying notes 31-39 infra.
13. The "practice of law" is an imprecise but frequently used "term
of art." Generally the power to regulate the practice of law means
not only the power to regulate bona fide practitioners, but the power
to define law practice. For example, the power has been used to justify
prohibiting lay persons from representing others before a state compen-
sation board although such practice was authorized by the board pursu-
ant to statutory authority. West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.
Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959). See generally Comment, Control of the
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U.
Cm. L. Rv. 162 (1960).
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tal premise of American state and federal governments.' 4 Gov-
ernmental power is divided among -three branches, the executive,
legislative, and judicial. Pure separation theory contemplates
that each branch will perform distinct functions and not en-
croach upon the domain of the others.15 This has been modified
in American practice by the complementary theory of checks
and balances, in which the powers of government are blended,
each branch exerting direct but limited control over the other
two. 6 Such controls include legislative power to impeach the
executive and members of the judiciary, 7 executive power to
veto legislation,' 8 and judicial power to exercise final review.19
The ultimate goal of this systerm of independent, balanced
branches is to ensure against the undue concentration of power
in any single department.
The connection between the doctrines of separation of
powers and inherent judicial powers in delineating the roles of
the legislature and the judiciary in regulating the practice of law
is a confusing one. If the power to regulate attorneys is neces-
sary to the functioning of the courts, it is an "inherent" judicial
power. But even if it is "inherently" judicial, the question
14. The United States Constitution and all state constitutions pro-
vide for vesting the powers of government in separate and distinct de-
partments. Thirty-six states further prohibit the separate departments
from exercising each other's powers. R. DIsxMAN, STATE CoNsTrru-
TIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT 6-7 (rev. ed. 1968). The Minnesota
Constitution is typical:
The powers of government snall be divided into three distinct
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of
the others except in the instances expressly provided in this
constitution.
MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15. See, e.g., M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
Powxas 13 (1967). Vile points out that few writers on the subject de-
fine exactly what they mean by "separation of powers" and that any
definition of a "pure" doctrine is somewhat arbitrary. Id. at 12.
16. Id. at 18.
17. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. VIII.
18. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 23.
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), firmly es-
tablished judicial review in the federal system, and various states also
recognize it, although it may be an "inferential" rather than an express
power. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893). Professional debate on the
origin and legitimacy of judicial review under the federal constitution
continues. See R. BERGER, CoNaREs v. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); L.
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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arises whether separation of powers theory requires that it be
exclusively or predominantly entrusted to the judicial branch.
The courts' search for an answer to this question is under-
standably marked by ambiguous and confusing decisions, for
determining the proper relationship between two coordinate
branches of government, even in a fairly narrow area such as
this, is at once a delicate and momentous task, and it involves a
confrontation that courts hesitate to undertake.20  The Su-
preme Court of Minnesota faced this task in a recent case,
Sharood v. Hatfield,21 involving a challenge to the constitution-
ality of a statute22 that conflicted with certain court rules govern-
ing the legal profession. The court held the statute unconstitu-
tional and in so doing sharply delineated the legislative-judicial
relationship by simply denying any legislative power to govern
the field.23
The Minnesota supreme court's conclusion that it has ex-
clusive power to regulate the practice of law is difficult to
characterize as a minority or majority position, relative to other
states, due to the elusiveness of judicial opinions on this subject.
Nevertheless, because Sharood v. Hatfield is a recent expression
by a state supreme court about the relationship of the inherent
power doctrine to regulation of the legal profession, it is an ap-
propriate vehicle for examination of the doctrine in that context.
This Note will first review the development of the Minnesota
court's present position. It will then suggest an alternative ap-
proach for determining the relationship of judicial and legislative
power in this area; one that seems to better comport with the
relevant constitutional doctrines and policy considerations.
I. REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
IN MINNESOTA
Early regulation of the legal profession in Minnesota
was characterized by concurrent legislative and judicial control.2
20. See text accompanying notes 70-76 infra. See also Comment,
Separation of Powers: Who Should Control the Bar? 47 J. URBAN L. 715
(1969).
21. 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
22. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 638. See notes 48-55 infra and accompany-
ing text.
23. See text accompanying notes 47-63 infra.
24. Concurrent control also characterized early regulation of the
profession in other states. See, e.g., Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal,
439, 443-45, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101
S.W.2d 977 (1937); Green, The Court's Power Over Admission and Dis-
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Statutes prescribed procedural requirements for admission and
disbarment and set out substantive offenses meriting the latter,25
but did not otherwise limit the state supreme court's exercise of
discretion in individual cases. Similarly, statutory law created a
board of examiners to administer the bar examination but au-
thorized the court to appoint the board and to accept or reject
board recommendations on applicants. 26 For many years there
was no apparent need to clarify whether the powers being
exercised in regulating the profession were "judicial" or "legisla-
tive" or whether one branch was intruding upon the functions of
the other.'27 While the Minnesota court never expressly recog-
nized the validity of legislative regulation, it grounded disbar-
ments upon statutory enactments; 28 utilized procedures set up by
barment, 4 TEXAs L. Rv. 1 (1925). English common-law practice also
involved both legislative and judicial control of attorneys. However,
English and colonial practice are of limited utility in delineating the
proper roles of the judiciary and legislature under a separation of pow-
ers system, since the relationship of the two branches under such a sys-
tem is quite different theoretically than under a parliamentary govern-
ment. Dowling, Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 638
(1935). For contrasting views of the significance of common-law prac-
tice, compare In re Day, 18 I. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899) with In re Cooper,
22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
25. Mnrm. REv. ST. (Terr.) ch. 93 (1851). For example, an attorney
could be removed for conviction of a felony, for deceit or willful mis-
conduct in his profession, or for willful disobedience of a court order.
Id. § 19.
26. Minn. Laws 1891, ch. 36. This statute did not set out require-
merits for the bar test, but did require the court to admit graduates
of the University of Minnesota Law School by diploma privilege.
27. An early federal case that arose in Minnesota tangentially
raised this question and has been frequently cited as authority for the
proposition that admission and disbarment are exclusively judicial acts.
Secombe sought a writ of mandamus from the United States Supreme
Court to set aside a disbarment order of the Supreme Court of the Terri-
tory of Minnesota. He contended that the court had not acted in accord-
ance with a territorial statute setting out, in general terms, the proce-
dures and grounds for disbarment. The United States Supreme Court
denied the writ, grounding its decision on the fact that the statute au-
thorized the Minnesota court to exercise judicial discretion in determin-
ing what constituted a violation of the law sufficient to justify disbar-
ment. The Court noted in passing that the power to admit and disbar
in common-law courts rested "exclusively with the court." Ex parte
Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1857). Although the court discussed
the exclusivity of judicial power to disbar at common law, it held that
the statute at issue authorized the Minnesota court to exercise its discre-
tion. It is curious, then, that the opinion came to be cited for the proposi-
tion that admission and disbarment are exclusively judicial functions.
See, e.g., In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 59, 248 N.W. 735, 739 (1933)
(quoting State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 540, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (1928)).
28. E.g., In re Arctander, 26 Minn. 215, 1 N.W. 43 (1879).
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the legislature for disciplinary actions;29 and complied with the
statute of limitations placed upon disbarment proceedings.3
In 1933 the Minnesota court first used the doctrine of
inherent judicial power to justify a particular disbarment for
which there was no statutory authorization. In re Greathouse 31
was a disbarment proceeding against a Minneapolis attorney
who had employed other attorneys to solicitate business for him.
This practice was not prohibited by statute32 and was fairly
common;33 the fault attributed to Greathouse was neither
breach of duty to his clients nor moral turpitude, the usual
grounds for disbarment, but rather "unethical conduct. '3 4 Since
no statutory authority for disciplining an attorney for this of-
fense existed, the court grounded its decision upon its own
inherent power to control the practice of law, stating:
The judicial power of this court has its origin in the consti-
tution; but when the court came into existence it came with
inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to
enable it to administer justice whether any previous form of
remedy has been granted or not.35
29. Southworth v. Bearnes, 88 Minn. 31, 92 N.W. 466 (1902).
30. In re Buck, 171 Minn. 352, 214 N.W. 662 (1927). There, the
court specifically cited the statute as barring certain charges against an
attorney in a disbarment proceeding, and clearly considered itself bound
by the limitation. Id. at 353, 214 N.W. at 662-63. See also In re Fried-
man, 183 Minn. 350, 236 N.W. 703 (1931) (the court declined to hear
the issue of the constitutionality of the statute of limitations). But see
notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
31. 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
32. Attorneys were prohibited by statute from employing lay solici-
tors. MIM. STAT. § 481.03 (1974) (originally enacted as Minn. Laws
1929, ch. 289, § 1). The issue in Greathouse was whether attorneys could
personally solicit business or employ other attorneys to do so, questions
not addressed by the statute.
33. 189 Minn. at 61, 64, 248 N.W. at 739-40. Greathouse was decided
during the era of the bar's "national drive" against ambulance chasers.
Extensive attorney solicitation systems were viewed with outrage as a
violation of legal ethics and a great injustice to the victims of accidents.
There was great pressure for reform from the organized bar, and reform-
ers turned both to the courts and the legislatures. See generally Nation-
wide War on "Ambulance Chasers," 14 A.B.A.J. 561 (1928). The Great-
house opinion suggests another reason for the drive against solicitation:
'"The lawyer agents of such soliciting system as here involved invade
the remote sections of the state and sell their employer's services in
the territory which geographically belongs to local attorneys .... Such
conduct . . .leads to underbidding." 189 Minn. at 61, 248 N.W. at 740.
Some recent commentary tends to favor solicitation, at least in the form
of advertising. See, e.g., Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest
Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HARv. Civ. Ri oTs-Civ. LiB. L.
REV. 77 (1973); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicita-
tion by Lawyers, 25 U. Car. L. REv. 674 (1958).
34. 189 Minn. at 53, 248 N.W. at 736-37.
35. Id. at 55, 248 N.W. at 737.
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The court specifically based its power to control attorneys on the
rationale that attorneys are officers of the court, vital to the
administration of justice:
The principal purpose of disbarring attorneys is for the pro-
tection of the public and to maintain a standard of administra-
tion of justice that will at all times inspire . . . confidence and
respect. The court has the power to discipline attorneys on the
grounds of self-protection, outside of the common law and out-
side of the statutory law, in cases where they have so conducted
themselves as to impair the administration of justice .... This
power is possessed by all courts which have authority to admit
attorneys to practice.3 6
The chief significance of the Greathouse decision was the
court's identification of its power to disbar as an inherent rather
than statutorily granted power, for this laid the foundation for
expansive exercise of judicial power in other areas where no
"enabling" legislation existed. The court later held, for exam-
ple, that it had the inherent power to enjoin nonforensic lay
practice37 and to make rules and regulations governing the
administrative structure of the bar.:38
None of these cases, however, passed directly on the rela-
tionship between judicial and legislative regulation of the prac-
tice of law, for in each case the court was defining its power in
the absence of conflicting legislation. Strong dicta in Great-
house, however, indicated that the power to admit and disbar
was exclusively judicial, and that judicial adherence to statu-
tory regulation of those subjects was a matter of courtesy rather
than an acknowledgment of legislative power.
Under our form of government, where the judicial consti-
tutes an independent branch, the character of [attorneys] should
be of the court's choosing and under the supervision of the court,
and other branches of the government should not be permitted
to embarrass or frustrate judicial functions by the intrusion of
incompetent or improper officers upon the courts. Courts will
defer to reasonable legislative regulation, but this deference is
36. Id. at 60-61, 248 N.W. at 739.
37. Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934) (enjoin-
ing claims adjuster from practicing law). "Having the power through
disciplinary proceedings to protect the public by preventing attorneys
from indulging in the unlawful practice of law. . ., it would be anoma-
lous if. we had no similar power to protect the public from the illegal
practice of law by laymen." Id. at 585, 254 N.W. at 911.
38. In re Petition for Integration of the Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.
2d 515 (1943). The court stated that it had the power to order the
creation of a statewide bar association with mandatory membership for
all attorneys, but it postponed doing so because so many attorneys were
absent from the state due to World War II, and in fact never did so.
In re Integration of the Bar, 226 Minn. 578, 34 N.W.2d 157 (1948).
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one of comity or courtesy rather than an acknowledgement of
power.39
The court first struck down a legislative enactment as
unconstitutionally interfering with its power to regulate attorneys
in In re Tracy,40 which invalidated the statute of limitations
governing disbarment proceedings.41 While the court implied
that the legislature lacked the power to enact any valid regula-
tions concerning admission and disbarment, it based its decision
on the narrower ground that the statute unreasonably interfered
with judicial discretion to consider evidence of misconduct in a
disbarment proceeding.42 In Cowern v. Nelson,4 3 the court, by
purporting to accept legislative policy through "comity," implied
even more strongly that its power to regulate the practice of law
was exclusive. The defendant, a real estate broker who had
been enjoined from drafting conveyances, did not contend that
the legislature had the power to permit lay practice of law.
Rather, he requested the court to recognize the policy underlying
a statute that prohibited lay practice generally but exempted his
particular activities. The court adopted this argument, choosing
to "defer to the legislative regulation as a declaration of public
policy in harmony with the expression of the courts in general,
and as a legislative effort to cooperate with and implement the
efforts of the courts in the enforcement of that policy. ' 44 With-
out explaining the distinction, however, the court refused to
accept the statutory exemption permitting brokers to, charge fees
for drafting legal documents. 45 The comity doctrine thus al-
39. In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 59, 248 N.W. 735, 739 (1933)
(quoting State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 540, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (1928)).
40. 197 Minn. 35,266 N.W. 88 (1936).
41. The statute, Minn. Laws 1921, ch. 334, was substantially the
same statute at issue in earlier cases. See note 30 supra.
42. The court noted that authorities supporting the proposition that
disbarment is a judicial act could be divided into two classes: those
holding that the legislature may prescribe minimum qualifications for
admission and grounds for disbarment, and those denying the legisla-
ture's power to regulate the subject in any way. The court identified
its own position with the latter, 197 Minn. at 45, 266 N.W. at 93, but
its holding actually rested on the following grounds:
[T]he statute in question is not only one of attempted limitation
but also, and even more importantly, a rule of evidence....
Our inquiry is into . . .professional conduct . . . [Wihat the
legislature inadvertently has attempted is to declare that we
cannot consider as evidence any conduct of an attorney except
such as has occurred within the stated and rather short periods.
Id. at 46, 266 N.W. at 93.
43. 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
44. Id. at 646, 290 N.W. at 797.
45. Id. at 647, 290 N.W. at 797.
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lowed the court to accept or reject the statutory provisions as it
chose, for whatever reasons, whether or not expressed. Later
decisions cited Cowern as having rejected as unconstitutional
statutes "attempting to authorize admissions to the bar by legis-
lative enactment."46
In Sharood v. Hatfield,47 the court explicitly held a statute
unconstitutional on the sole ground that the legislature lacked
the power to regulate the practice of law. Moreover, although
indicating that the comity doctrine still applied, the court ig-
nored an obvious opportunity to employ it, thus suggesting that
the court no longer perceives any practical or theoretical reason
for deferring to the legislature in this context. The statute at
issue revised the manner in which all occupations licensed by the
state, including the legal profession, are regulated 48 Provisions
of the statute transferred a special fund, previously established
by statute for attorney registration fees, 49 to the general revenue
fund;50 replaced a standing appropriation with a general appro-
priation to finance bar examinations and disciplinary activities;5 1
changed the size and composition of a court-appointed attorney
disciplinary board previously created by court rule;52 permitted
46. In re Petition for Integration of the Bar, 216 Minn. 195, 200,
12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943). See also Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416,
424, 210 N.W.2d 275, 280 (1973) (statutes "attempting to regulate the
practice of law" are unconstitutional). 9be court's opposition did not re-
quire it to reject all legislative assistance in carrying out its functions,
and it continued to rely upon statutory provisions. See In re MacDon-
ald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938) (Board of Law Examiners). More-
over, it should be noted that although the logical extension of the inher-
ent power doctrine reached in Sharood, see text accompanying notes
47-63 infra, suggests that no legislation dealing with the legal profession
can have any force or effect, as a practical matter many statutes dealing
with attorney conduct remain effective and as yet unchallenged. See,
e.g., MAUN. STAT. § 481.13 (1974) (attorney's lien); id. ch. 319A (profes-
sional corporations).
47. 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
48. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 638.
49. Prior to 1961, funds for bar examinations and disciplinary ac-
tivities came out of general tax funds and bar association contributions.
In that year the court decided that this financing method was inappro-
priate and by court rule set up a special fund to replace it. Rules Re-
garding Registration of Attorneys, 260 Minn. vii (1961). A statute was
later passed to permit deposit of the fees in the state treasury in a
dedicated fund with a standing annual appropriation to the court. 1NN.
STAT. § 481.01 (1974).
50. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 638, § 59.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 60. The board had been set up by court rule in 1970,
mINNESOTA SuPREwIm COURT RULES ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILnY, to
replace an earlier scheme that utilized the Board of Law Examiners,
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the use of national standardized tests for bar examinations; 53
and arguably gave the Commissioner of Administration author-
ity to set the amount of attorney registration fees54 and to control
other administrative details.55
The court's opinion concentrates on the funding provisions
of the statute. These provisions would have transferred to the
general revenue fund a special statutory fund composed of at-
torneys' fees. A standing appropriation of the special fund to
the court would have been eliminated and a general appropria-
tion substituted in its place.5 6 The court left unresolved an
ambiguity in the statute's effective date,57 the resolution of
in conjunction with state and district bar association ethics committees,
for conducting disciplinary activities. Rules for Investigating Com-
plaints Involving Professional Conduct of Attorneys and for Conducting
Disciplinary Proceedings, 260 Minn. x (1961). The new law would have
reduced the membership of the board from 19 to 15, increased the num-
ber of lay members from three to six, shortened members' terms, and
provided a per diem allowance for "activity directly connected with
board activity." These provisions were perhaps the most direct potential
interference with the judicial power to control the practice of law, since
control of the nature and membership of the agency responsible for disci-
plinary activities may afford indirect control of those activities. Any
legislative influence in the actual disciplinary process would have been
remote, however, as appointment of members and final decisionmaking
remained solely in the hands of the court, where it had been since the
first board of law examiners was set up by the legislature. See note
26 and accompanying text supra.
53. MImN. STAT. § 214.03 (1974). The supreme court stated without
discussing the point that this section required the use of standardized
tests. 296 Minn. at 421, 210 N.W.2d at 278. This interpretation is ques-
tionable, for the statute prescribes that all state boards "shall use" stand-
ardized tests "to the extent that such ... tests are appropriate" and
specifically exempts tests where knowledge of local law was important.
This indicates that discretion was to be left to the licensing board. More-
over, the amicus brief of the Senate indicated that this section was not
intended by the legislature to affect bar examinations. Brief for 68th
Minnesota State Senate as Amicus Curiae at 7, Sharood v. Hatfield, 296
Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
54. M_.u. STAT. § 214.06 (1974). This section of the statute permits
all licensing boards to raise statutory license fees with the approval
of the Commissioner of Administration, and was designed to avoid the
need for statutory amendment each time such a change was desired.
Since attorney license fees were not set by statute, this section could
have been interpreted as wholly inapplicable to attorney license fees.
See Petition of Respondents for Rehearing at 29-31.
55. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 638, § 64. This section gave the Commis-
sioner authority to provide administrative support services to all the
licensing boards. The court did not specifically discuss this section.
56. See note 57 infra.
57. The ambiguities as to the statute's effective date are somewhat
complex. By one possible interpretation, the unexpended balance of the
court's special fund would have been transferred on July 1, 1973, and
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
which could have permitted the court to avoid for as long as
three years the impact of the funding provisions. The court
apparently proceeded on the assumption that the legislature's
mere attempt to manage the fund in any manner was an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of judicial power regardless of the effect
on the court's activities.
The court did not separately discuss the other provisions of
the statute except in attempting to demonstrate that they created
a justiciable issue because they conflicted with existing court
rules.58 The court treated these provisions in the aggregate in
holding that "in so far as they apply to the judicial branch of
government [the provisions of the law] are hereby declared to
since no general appropriation had been made to replace the fund prior
to legislative adjournment, the courts' agencies would have been cut
off without money for the July bar examination. See 296 Minn. at 427-
28, 210 N.W.2d at 281-82. This impenissible result could have been
avoided by construing the effective date of the funding provisions as
July 1, 1976, in accordance with the Attorney General's opinion. Op.
Att'y Gen. 83 (June 14, 1973). Given that effective date, the act's only
impact would have been a future change in the appropriation mechan-
ism; attorney fees would have gone into the general revenue fund, mak-
ing the court's agencies financially dependent upon periodic legislative
appropriations, as they had been prior to 1961. See note 50 supra. These
alternative resolutions of the effective date of the statute might have
produced different answers to the constitutional question, for a threat
of inmminent impoverishment clearly jeopardizes the independence of thejudicial branch, while including funds for judicial activities in the gen-
eral appropriation process might have no impact at all. The legislature
could, of course, have arbitrarily refused to appropriate enough money
for the court's activities once the change was made, but an assumption
that it would do so would have been speculative. Numerous judicial
activities have been financed by general appropriation and the legisla-
ture has never arbitrarily refused to appropriate funds. Brief for 68th
Minnesota Senate as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Sharood v. Hatfield, 296
Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
The court's opinion appears at times to assume that financial harm
was imminent, but since the court specifically declined to resolve the
ambiguity in the statute's effective date, it is apparent that actual finan-
cial harm was irrelevant to the decision. The mere legislative attempt
to handle "money held in trust" by Ihe court, 296 Minn. at 420, 210
N.W.2d at 277, was beyond legislative prerogative irrespective of harmful
or beneficial effects.
58. 296 Minn. at 421-22, 210 N.W.2d at 278. The respondents con-
tended that no overt act interfering with the court's control over the
practice of law had occurred. The court determined that since sections
of the statute conflicted with court rules, a justiciable issue as to whether
the court's power was curtailed was nonetheless created: "We need not
wait until we are impotent to discharge our judicial duties before we
assert our inherent power to preserve what is clearly a judicial function."
Id. at 422, 210 N.W.2d at 278.
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be an unconstitutional assumption of judicial power by the
legislature."5 0
The full implications of Sharood cannot be appreciated
without examining the court's treatment of the "comity" theory.
The court mentioned its general willingness to cooperate with
the legislative branch,60 noting its previous acceptance of legisla-
tion regulating "administrative procedures for admission and
discipline of attorneys" so long as the court retained the power to
make the "final decision." 61 However, by failing to explain, or
apparently even consider, how the statute impaired its function-
ing, the court appeared to ignore the spirit of cooperation it al-
luded to:
We have no doubt but what some of the provisions of [the
statute] as they apply to the judiciary were well motivated, .and
upon adequate consideration it is entirely possible that the court
may wish to adopt some the provisions by rule of the court.
However, in so doing, we do not concede that their enactment
was a permissible legislative prerogative. 2
If the comity theory is not utilized when legislative regulation is
well motivated and reflective of what the court itself might do if
it adequately considered the issue, it is difficult to imagine when
the doctrine will be applied. Sharood thus not only holds that
the legislature may not validly regulate the legal profession, but
it also appears to negate the possibility of legislative influence in
the matter. 3
IT. A PRACTICAL ACCOMMODATION
OF SEPARATED POWERS
The development of the doctrine of inherent judicial power
to regulate the practice of law in Minnesota illustrates a steady
59. Id. at 429, 210 N.W.2d at 282.
60. Id. at 425, 210 N.W.2d at 280.
61. Id. at 424, 210 N.W.2d at 279. In fact, the court had in the
past accepted legislation regulating substantive matters as well. See
notes 25-26, 28-30 supra. It should be noted that none of the provisions
in the statute at issue in Sharood deprived the court of the "final deci-
sion" to admit, disbar, or discipline an attorney.
62. 296 Minn. at 424-25, 210 N.W.2d at 280.
63. Several bills attempting to circumvent Sharood and reestablish
some legislative control over the legal profession have been introduced.
One would have created a legislative board to admit and regulate prac-
titioners of law outside the courtroom, leaving admission and regulation
of courtroom practitioners to the courts. S.F. 1052, 69th Legis. Sess.
(1975). A more extreme proposal, for a constitutional amendment,
would have prohibited attorneys from serving in the legislature, appar-
ently on the premise that if attorneys are officers of the courts they




evolution away from the historical and logical origins of the
concept. The Minnesota supreme court began by accepting and
depending upon legislative enactments to regulate admission and
disbarment; it then determined that statutory authorization was
unnecessary because the power to regulate inhered in the court.
This power in turn expanded to reach matters less directly re-
lated to the actual adjudicatory process, such as nonforensic lay
practice and the administration of an organized bar. Finally, the
court determined that inherent judicial power over the practice
of law necessarily implied exclusive judicial power and, con-
versely, legislative impotence.
It is at this latter juncture-that connecting and equating
inherent with exclusive judicial power over the practice of law-
that the Minnesota court's reasoning becomes questionable. The
court achieved the equation by resort to the assertion that its
ability to execute its "fundamental functions of ... the admin-
istration of justice and the protection of the rights guaranteed by
the constitution . . ." is so dependent upon "the assistance and
cooperation of an able, vigorous, and honorable bar" that the
power to make rules governing the legal profession must be
"exclusively reserved to the court." 64 The court premised this
assumption of exclusive power on the doctrine of separation of
powers, incorporated in the Minnesota Constitution. Thus, the
court reasoned, "if it is a judicial function that the legislative act
purports to exercise, we must not hesitate to preserve what is
essentially a judicial function" by declaring the act unconstitu-
tional.65
This reasoning appears to contain two mistaken assump-
tions: first, that because the assistance and cooperation of attor-
neys are essential to the proper functioning of the courts, the
courts, to ensure such assistance and cooperation, must exclude
all legislative control of the practice of law; second, that the
separation of powers doctrine justifies and indeed compels this
result. The remaider of this Note will attempt to elaborate these
criticisms and to propose an interpretation of the inherent pow-
ers doctrine more consistent with t-he policies underlying separa-
tion of powers and with the realities of the legislative and
judicial functions. 66
64. Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 422-23, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279(1973) (quoting In re Petition for Integration of Bar, 216 Minn. 195,
199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943)).
65. Id. at 423, 210 N.W.2d at 279.
66. While the proposed interpretation will be discussed primarily
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Any application of the separation of powers principle must
take into account the reality that governmental power involves
"vast stretches of ambiguous territory" that cannot be demarcat-
ed by "abstract, analytical lines," but rather require "practical
exposition" that takes into consideration "necessary areas of
interaction" between the branches of government.6 7 Thus the
scope and exclusivity of inherent judicial power to regulate the
practice of law should be delineated by a pragmatic accommoda-
tion of the respective interests of the legislature and the judiciary
in the particular matter to be regulated, not by a simplistic
application of separation of powers to justify the conclusory
assertion that because attorneys are essential to courts, only
courts can regulate attorneys. This is not to deny constitutional
significance to the delineation, but only to require recognition
that the appropriate constitutional relations between judiciary
and legislature in particular cases are not determinable by un-
critical application of abstract theory.
The legislature, as the representative voice of the people, is
charged with "the primary responsibility for adjusting public
affairs."68  The judiciary, on the other hand, is charged with
resolving particular disputes, construing statutes and constitu-
tions in the context of such disputes, and intersticially creating
law in the common-law tradition. Legislative power over the
practice of law should thus stem from the legislature's general
interest in serving the public, while judicial power must stem
from the need to assure that attorneys effectively aid the courts
in deciding cases. If these premises are accepted, justification
for denying legislative power can arise only from a reasoned
analysis of how a particular piece of legislation interferes with
the judicial function, not from a simple denial of power based on
with reference to regulation of the practice of law, the principles sug-
gested are applicable as well to other areas in which inherent powers
questions may arise. Indeed, in another context---compelling payment
of public funds for judicial purposes-the Minnesota court itself has dis-
cussed the theoretical underpinnings of the inherent judicial power doc-
trine in terms similar to the text accompanying notes 67-69 infra. In
re Clerk of Court's Compensation for Lyon County, 241 N.W.2d 781
(Minn. 1976). It is not clear whether the restrictive analysis utilized in
the Lyon County case, wherein inherent judicial power is delineated in
terms of "practical necessity," would be applied by the Minnesota court
in the already well established and somewhat jealously guarded context
of regulation of the legal profession.
67. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in
Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa-
tion of Powers, 37 HAiv. L. Ray. 1010, 1012-16 (1924).
68. Id. at 1016.
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"'mystical emanation[s] inhering in the unique nature of a
court."
6 9
Virtually all courts claim the inherent judicial power to
admit, supervise, and disbar attorneys and generally regulate the
practice of law,70 but most courts also recognize some degree of
legislative power over the same subjects3 1 Judicial opinions on
this point, however, tend to be elusive, confusing, and copiously
laced with dicta, so that identification of the theoretical source of
the legislature's power is difficult. Some courts have taken a
position similar to that of the Minnesota court, asserting that
legislative regulation of the practice of law is effective only
insofar as the court acquiesces hi it, either as a matter of
comity,72 or to avoid friction between the departments,73 or be-
cause the legislation is a mere declaration of the court's inherent
power, analogous perhaps to a codification of judicial opin-
ion.7 4 Other courts at times have asserted that legislative regu-
lation of the practice of law is permissible if it "aids" the
judiciary and does not interfere with or derogate judicial power
and independence.7 5 Still others have stated that the legislature
69. Id. at 1022.
70. See cases collected in Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Ju-
diciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935).
71. See Annot., 151 A.L.R. 617 (1944) (integration of the bar); An-
not., 144 A.L.R. 150 (1943) (admission to the bar); Annot., 81 A.L.R.
1064 (1932) (same); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1512 (1930) (same). A few courts
hold that the legislature has plenary power to regulate the practice of
law. In re Applicants for License, 14. N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906); In
re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860).
72. State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 539, 221 N.W. 603, 605 (1928).
73. Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 846, 115 P. 646, 647 (1911).
74. Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Ky. 1963).
75. Courts use this language in several senses. Criminal statutes
have been described as "aids": "The legislative department may pass
acts declaring the unauthorized practice of law illegal and punishable.
Such statutes are merely in aid of, mid do not supersede or detract
from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of
law." People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349,
8 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1937). "Aids" may also describe statutory enactments
providing procedural machinery to render the court's exercise of power
more convenient and effective. In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 173-74,
37 N.E.2d 516, 521 (1941). Further, "aids" may mean substantive rules
and regulations that do not thwart the court's own powers. State ex
rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 203, 109 N.W.2d 685, 690 (1961).
Obviously this approach presents difficulties similar to those pre-
sented by the comity theory. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
It fails to identify with precision the standards or principles that deter-
mine what type of statutory assistance is constitutionally acceptable to
the courts, and essentially requires a judicial "vote" to make a legislative
act constitutionally valid,
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may validly regulate the practice of law in the exercise of its
police power to protect the public welfare, so long as it does not
materially and unreasonably interfere with the judicial branch. 76
This last, "police power" theory most closely approximates
the suggested pragmatic determination of the power of each
branch in terms of its constitutional functions, for it recognizes
that both legislature and judiciary have a legitimate interest in
regulating the practice of law and thus possess the constitutional
power to do so. The approach was well stated by the Missouri
court in Clark v. Austin 7
[Courts have] the inherent power to protect their own exist-
ence and functioning as constitutional courts, which includes the
right to regulate the practice of law. They can make rules on
that subject when there are no statutes, or supplementing stat-
utes and imposing additional regulations. And they can strike
down, as unconstitutionally usurping judicial power, any statute
unreasonably encroaching upon, and therefore frustrating, their
right to protect themselves....
But it does not follow that the courts have the exclusive
power to regulate the practice of law, or that they recognize
legislation on that subject only out of comity. So far as is
necessary to their self-protection the right of the courts is para-
mount or exclusive; but beyond that point the legislative depart-
ment also has constitutional rights in the exercise of the police
power. If the courts were lax and slothful in regulating the
practice of law, it would hardly be contended lawyers would
be left free to prey upon the public, because, forsooth, they are
officers of the court, and that the legislative department would
be helpless.78
The legislature's police power over the legal profession
follows from its acknowledged right to regulate other profession-
al groups affected with a public responsibility.79 Attorneys are
76. See, e.g., In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 95, 54 N.E. 646, 652 (1899);
In re Bonam, 255 Mich. 59, 61, 237 N.W. 45, 46 (1931); Clark v. Austin,
340 Mo. 467, 482, 101 S.W.2d 977, 985 (1937) (concurring opinion by
majority of the court).
The police power of the legislature is sometimes recognized only
insofar as the legislature seeks to set minimum admission standards,
In -,e Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 396, 240 N.W. 441, 450 (1932), and it is
sometimes said that the legislature employs its police power in "aid"
of the judiciary. Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 109, 166 S.E.2d 718,
723 (1969). The theory developed in the text accompanying notes 77-
94 infra is not intended to adopt these views of narrowly circumscribed
legislative power.
77. 340 Mo. 467, 482 101 S.W.2d 977, 985 (1937) (concurring opinion
by majority of the court).
78. Id. at 496, 101 S.W.2d at 994.
79. See, e.g., Fowler v. Board of Registration in Chiropody, 374
Mich. 254, 132 N.W.2d 82 (1965); Hunstiger v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474,
153 N.W. 869 (1915).
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not solely officers of the courts. They are businessmen and
representatives of their clients, and they perform functions essen-
tial to all three branches of governament.8 0 It has been suggest-
ed, in fact, that attorneys should be subject to more regulation
and supervision than other groups precisely because their con-
duct is so influential in shaping the "policies of the people."181
Since the legal profession affects the public in general at least as
much as it does the operation of the judicial branch, the elected
representatives of the people should have a voice in its regulation.
Further evidence of the legislative interest in regulating the
profession can be found in judicial opinions themselves. Courts
often cite maintenance of public respect for the administration of
justice8 2 and protection of the public welfare8 3 as policies bear-
ing on the decision whether or not to regulate attorneys in
particular respects. Judicial action taken in the name of those
policies obviously suggests the need for public participation in
formulating them. While the judiciary may properly exercise its
inherent power to protect the public from the misdeeds of its
officers where the legislature has not acted, 4 it seems that the
public's representatives should be entrusted with predominant
power over matters in which public -respect and welfare are the
primary concerns.
Furthermore, there may be some danger that exclusive
judicial control of the bar will undermine public confidence in
80. On this basis one writer has questioned whether there should
be any inherent judicial power to regulate attorneys. See Beardsley,
The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A.J. 509
(1933).
81. "The necessity for regulating the conduct of attorneys is appar-
ent. It has been, throughout the ages, that the lawyers, in a large meas-
ure, shape the policies of the people.... Such being the case, the con-
duct of the lawyer should be a special object of consideration at the
hands of each department of government." State Bar v. McGhee, 148
Okla. 219, 224, 298 P. 580, 585 (1931). See also State Bar v. Superior
Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 P. 432 (1929); In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292
P. 291 (1930); In re Gibson, 35 N.M. 550. 4 P.2d 643 (1931).
82. One of the chief justifications for the anti-solicitation decisions
was maintaining public respect for and confidence in the administration
of justice. See, e.g., In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
83. Cases prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law are frequent-
ly justified on the ground of protecting the public. E.g., Cowern v.
Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); see Comment, Control of
the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power,
28 U. Cmi. L. REV. 162 (1960).
84. One commentator has suggested that the growth of the concept
of inherent judicial power can be attributed in part to enthusiasm for
reform of the bar in the face of legislative inaction. Note, Admission
to the Bar and the Separation of Powers 7 UTAH L. REv. 82, 88-89 (1960).
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the court, 5 for such control might appear as selfish, politically
motivated protection of the courts and the legal profession in
general.86 Certainly at least some issues concerning the practice
of law can most appropriately be handled by the legislature,
inasmuch as it is designed to ascertain and respond to the
various competing demands of a broad public constituency. s7
But recognition of the legislature's power to regulate the
practice of law should not be an acknowledgement of unre-
strained power, for the unique position of attorneys as officers of
the court-their essential role in the administration of justice-
should impose limitations on legislative action. "Courts must
have the authority 'necessary in a strict sense' to enable them to
go on with their work"38s and fulfill their primary constitutional
function: to decide disputes, impartially and efficently, free from
undue external pressure. Legislative regulation that materially
and unreasonably interferes with that function would appear
unconstitutional under any interpretation of separation of pow-
85. See Beardsley, supra note 80, at 511:
The inherent power doctrine is detrimental to the courts, as
well as to the bar, because it places a severe strain upon the
standing of the courts with the public. Generally, the courts are
not subjected to the public criticism which is incidental to con-
troversial governmental matters, because the public understands
that the function of the courts is simply to administer the law as
it is, and that the courts have no direct responsibility for what
the law is. This understanding of the nature of the judicial
function is the foundation of the public's respect for the courts.
86. The dangers of judicial entanglement in political issues was
expressed by Justice Frankfurter:
The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's
complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the
clash of political forces in political settlements.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter was speaking of the Court's refusal to decide political
questions in an adjudicatory capacity, but the reasoning applies with
equal force to a court's need to remain as detached as possible in its
regulatory functions. That regulation of the bar involves highly con-
troversial and political issues is evidenced by the controversy surround-
ing advertising. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
87. In the course of rulemaking, the court or its agencies could
of course seek public input by holding public hearings, but this does
not rectify the problem of ensuring that the public has a representative
vote in matters that are primarily of public concern. Furthermore, like
any administrative agency, the court in its administrative capacity may
be unduly influenced by the special interest group being regulated, here
the bar. See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529-30
(1972).
88. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 67, at 1022.
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ers. Unlike "comity" or "exclusivity," however, this "function-
al" approach clothes properly enacted legislative regulations
with a presumption of constitutionality and thus requires a
specific showing of infirmity to invalidate them.Y9 Concomi-
tantly, under this approach the legislature may be able to cure
the infirmity. It thus maintains broad legislative authority to
regulate a profession whose activities profoundly affect the
general welfare, while leaving unimpaired the ultimate author-
ity of a court to protect its integrity and resist encroachment by
a coordinate branch.9 0
The approach suggested here would restrict the scope of
judicial power asserted by some courts. 91 The judicial branch
could regulate the practice of law where the legislature had
not acted, and, as generally pertams today, judicial and legis-
lative regulation could exist concurrently. Where legislative and
judicial regulations conflicted, however, the proper scope of each
would be delineated in terms of the primary function of the
respective branches; the legislature's interest in public welfare
would control unless the regulation in issue unreasonably ham-
pered the judiciary in the adjudicatory process. 92
One provision of the statute at issue in Sharood affords a
good example of the way in which such an analysis might be
89. See, e.g., State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 467-68, 156
N.W.2d 908, 921 (1968).
90. "The sum total of this matter is that the Legislature may put
reasonable restrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts pro-
vided they do not defeat or materially impair the exercise of those func-
tions." Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 441, 281 P. 1018, 1020
(1929). See also Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 482, 101 S.W.2d 977, 985
(1937) (concurring opinion by majority of the court).
91. It is difficult to predict the practical effects of a reasoned appli-
cation of this approach, for, as noted previously, courts often speak oE
exclusive judicial power while accepting legislative regulation. See
notes 70-76 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the final decision
as to the constitutionality of any given statute would necessarily remain
with the court, and therefore the effectiveness of the theory in restricting
judicial power would depend upon strict judicial adherence to the pro-
posed, standard. Adherence would be assisted by the presumption of
constitutionality, which would at least require the court, before invali-
dating a statute, to specifically discuss how the statute impaired its
operations or threatened its independence.
92. Traditionally, legislatures have tended to rely on judicial regu-
lation of the legal profession, perhaps out of deference to the superior
expertise of the judiciary and the advantages of unified control of the
bar, Green, The Courts' Power Over Admission and Disbarment, 4 TEXAs
L. REV. 1, 18 (1925); or because of reluctance to grapple with the con-
stitutional limitations imposed by the courts on legislative power by
means of the inherent power doctrine. For an example of a legislative
attempt to regulate the bar that slowly died in committee because of
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applied. The legislative determination that the public interest
would best be served by lay membership on the attorney discipli-
nary board,9 3 with appointment authority retained by the court,
would be prima facie within the legislative police power. Since
the court would retain authority both to appoint the board and
to make the final decision as to whether to discipline particular
attorneys, no interference with the court's operations would be
apparent. Only if it could be shown that lay membership
would unreasonably hamper the board's ability to investigate
improper conduct and hence the judiciary's ability to rid itself of
incompetent officers would invalidation of the statute be appro-
priate. The mere fact that the legislature had supplanted a
court rule pertaining to attorneys would be insufficient cause
for invalidating the statute.
The proposed analysis would similarly restrict judicial in-
validation of statutes authorizing out-of-court lay practice, such
as lay representation before administrative agencies or the "prac-
tice of law" by real estate brokers in connection with their
business. In the case of lay representation before an executive
agency, the only interference with the adjudicatory process
would be the unlikely possibility that inadequate records might
be produced and hamper judicial review on appeal.9 4  Simi-
larly, in the case of lay performance of such "lawyer-like" tasks
as drawing up documents of conveyance, any impact upon the
judicial branch would result only from a possible increase in
litigation generated by lay incompetence. Neither interference
would seem sufficiently substantial to warrant the judiciary over-
turning a legislative judgment that such lay practice is desirable.
By contrast, an example of unconstitutional legislation
might be a statute abrogating the attorney's duty to disclose to
the court legal authority known to her to be adverse to her
client's position.9 5 If permitted, such a statute would deprive
the court of assistance of counsel in cases before it and thus
directly affect the adjudicatory process.
The history of concurrent legislative and judicial regulation
of the legal profession in Minnesota, and the relatively narrow
legislative concern with its separation of powers implications, see La-
Belle, New Disciplinary Rules for Michigan Attorneys, 54 JUDICATURE
154 (1970).
93. See note 52 supra.
94. The federal government has commonly permitted the use of lay
counsel in administrative proceedings, without any apparent increase in
problems on review. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar,
373 U.S. 379 (1963).
95. ABA CODE or PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsBILTY DR 7-106 (B) (1).
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holdings of the cases before Sharood, would have permitted
implementation of the proposed approach. However, Sharood's
denial of any legislative power to regulate the legal profession
makes present adoption of such an approach highly unlikely.
Moreover, in refusing to accept a statute that it suggested was
reasonable, the Sharood court apparently precluded a comity
approach to achievement of the goas suggested here.
Since the scope of the court's inherent power is a question
of constitutional dimensions, a change in present Minnesota law
can occur only through a modification of the court's position or
by constitutional amendment. 96 2lthough a specific constitu-
tional amendment readjusting the balance of power between the
legislative and judicial branches is :possible, this course of action
presents serious difficulties. The iudiciary requires broad dis-
cretionary powers to maintain its independence; an abstract
compartmentalization of the subjects each branch would be
permitted to regulate would be too limiting and inflexible.
The most practicable means of restoring needed legislative
influence over the legal profession. would be a change in the
court's position.97 Although acknowledgment of the legisla-
ture's right to regulate in this area would be the most desirable
change, even a return to the wise exercise of judicial discretion
through comity would at least remove the chilling effect of
Sharood and encourage legislative assistance in regulating the
practice of law. Careful attention to good faith legislative en-
actments and the reasons underlying them coupled with explicit,
detailed consideration of how such enactments affect the judicial
branch could do much to restore harmony and balance between
the two branches. After all, the goals of both are the same:
"the good of the people in the administration of justice. 91 8
96. It must be noted that several state constitutions specifically en-
trust the power to regulate attorney conduct and the practice of law
to the judiciary. See, e.g., Anx. Co sT. amend. XXVIII; FLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 23; N.J. CoNsT. art. 6, § 2, f 3.
97. But cf. note 66 supra.
98. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 497, 101 S.W.2d 977, 994 (1937)
(concurring opinion by majority of the court).
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